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Abstract
Recent experimental studies  have examined  GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS and a host  of  other 
primary metaphors. However, complex mappings such as INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS have 
been largely ignored, nor has there been any attempt to distinguish their effects from those of 
primary metaphors such as  GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS.  The current study assesses both the 
non-primary  metaphoric  mapping  INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS and the  well-documented 
primary metaphor GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS in a visual priming task. The study finds that a 
bright background encourages photos of faces to be rated as both more intelligent and well-
intentioned, though the background does not significantly affect either attribute alone. This 
suggests that two metaphors with the same source domain can reinforce each other.  The 
study also underscores the difficulty in assessing a non-primary mapping in isolation from 
other factors.
Bisherige experimentelle Studien haben die Metaphern „Güte ist Helligkeit“ und zahlreiche 
andere  primäre  Metaphern  untersucht.  Doch  komplexe metaphorische  mappings wie 
„Intelligenz ist Helligkeit“ wurden weitgehend ignoriert. Es gab auch keinen Versuch, die 
Wirkungen dieser komplexen Metaphern von denen der primären Metaphern wie „Güte ist 
Helligkeit“  zu  unterscheiden.  Die  aktuelle  Studie  beurteilt  sowohl  das  komplexe 
metaphorische mapping „Intelligenz  ist  Helligkeit“  und  die  gut  dokumentierte  primäre 
Metapher „Güte ist Helligkeit“ in einem visuellen Versuch. Der neuen Studie nach werden 
Fotos von Gesichtern als intelligenter und wohlmeinender beurteilt, wenn sie einen hellen 
Hintergrund  haben,  obwohl  der  Hintergrund  keines  dieser  Attribute  allein  wesentlich 
beeinflusst.  Dies  suggeriert,  dass  zwei  Metaphern  mit  dem  gleichen  Quell-Konzept  sich 
verstärken. Die Studie unterstreicht, wie schwierig es ist, komplexe metaphorische mappings 
isoliert von anderen Faktoren zu beurteilen.
Keywords
Primary metaphor, complex mapping, visual priming, source and target domain, conceptual 
metaphor theory
7
metaphorik.de 23/2013
A tangled knot of target domains: 
Assessing INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS  and GOODNESS  IS 
BRIGHTNESS  in an image rating task
1. Primary versus complex metaphors
In recent years, studies have shown that metaphors can affect perception and 
judgement, suggesting that these metaphors are conceptual rather than purely 
linguistic. Research has focused on primary metaphors, including GOODNESS IS 
BRIGHTNESS (Meier  et  al.  2004;  Peña et  al.  2009;  Frank & Gilovich 1988;  cf. 
Nickels  2007),  SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS (Casasanto  2008),  CONTROL IS UP 
(Schubert 2005; Valenzuela & Soriano 2009), AFFECTION IS WARMTH (Williams & 
Bargh 2008;  Zhong & Leonardelli  2008),  IMPORTANCE IS SIZE (Valenzuela  & 
Soriano 2008; Schubert et al. 2009),  TIME IS SPACE (Boroditsky 2000; Casasanto 
et al. 2005), MORALITY IS CLEANLINESS (Zhong & Liljenquist 2006), and HAPPY IS 
UP (Meier & Robinson 2004).
All these metaphors are “primary” in that they are based on the association of 
co-occurring experiences, such as  AFFECTION and  WARMTH, a correlation that 
leads to the establishment of  the metaphor  AFFECTION IS WARMTH (Johnson 
1997;  Grady  1997;  Grady  &  Johnson  1998;  Sullivan  2007,  2013).  Other 
metaphors are complex, in that they are based on a combination of primary 
metaphors  and  structural  correspondences  rather  than  direct  experiential 
correlations. For example, the relation between THEORIES and BUILDINGS (as in 
the foundation of an argument) is not experientially based, because theories 
and buildings do not tend to co-occur in the world (Grady 1997). 
Both primary and complex metaphors are theorized to be conceptual as well 
as linguistic. For example, the metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH is apparent in 
linguistic expressions such as warm greeting or icy stare. However, conceptual 
theories  of  metaphor  presume  that  the  structure  AFFECTION IS WARMTH is 
primarily  cognitive,  and  only  secondarily  surfaces  in  language  (Lakoff  & 
Johnson 1980). The psycholinguistic studies listed above offer evidence that 
the conceptual theories are correct. If the temperature of a cup of coffee can 
affect feelings of  AFFECTION,  even in the absence of any language related to 
WARMTH, then the association between AFFECTION and WARMTH is necessarily 
conceptual and not merely linguistic (Williams & Bargh 2008).
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The available psycholinguistic evidence for complex metaphors is much less 
compelling.  Only  a  few  complex  metaphors  have  been  examined 
experimentally,  such  as  ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Gibbs  & 
O’Brian 1990; Gibbs et al. 1997; Valenzuela & Soriano 2007). This metaphor is 
complex, in that angry behaviour and boiling containers do not literally co-
occur in  the world.  However,  studies  of  complex metaphors  such as  these 
present the metaphors linguistically, as metaphoric sentences or phrases. As 
such, they do not test whether the complex metaphors are active in cognition 
outside of language.
The current  experiment employs visual  stimuli  to  examine  INTELLIGENCE IS 
BRIGHTNESS, a non-primary correspondence which underlies expressions such 
as  bright  thinker and  dim student.  In  the world,  intelligent  people  do not 
literally emit light, so the mapping between INTELLIGENCE and BRIGHTNESS is 
not  experientially  based.  Instead,  the  mapping  is  realized  by  a  systematic 
series of extensions from  BRIGHTNESS to  INTELLIGENCE (illuminate, shed light  
on,  dim,  bright,  brilliant)  built  around  the  primary  metaphor  KNOWING IS 
SEEING. INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS can  form  the  basis  of  novel  linguistic 
expressions (intellectual supernova, a guttering candle of an intellect). Finally, 
though  the  metaphor  is  far  from  linguistically  universal,  INTELLIGENCE IS 
BRIGHTNESS occurs in a range of languages including Spanish (una persona 
brillante ‘a brilliant person’; tiene pocas luces ‘S/he doesn’t have many lights’ 
meaning ‘S/he is stupid’). In sum, INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS is theorized to 
exist  on the basis of the same type of linguistic evidence as other complex 
mappings and complex metaphors, making it an acceptable test case for this 
large class of metaphors and mappings. 
The chief difficulty in examining INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS is distinguishing 
its  effects  from  those  of  the  well-documented  metaphor  GOODNESS IS 
BRIGHTNESS (Meier et al. 2004; Peña et al. 2009), since INTELLIGENCE is generally 
considered a  GOOD quality.  For  this  reason,  the  current  study assessed the 
effects  of BRIGHTNESS on both  INTELLIGENCE and  GOODNESS.  To evaluate the 
impact  of  BRIGHTNESS on  INTELLIGENCE independently  of  GOODNESS,  the 
experiment introduced each set of stimuli with a story. Each story involved a 
group of protagonists  who exhibited combinations of  intelligence/stupidity 
with good/bad intentions. The story was then followed by a series of faces 
against either light or dark backgrounds, and participants were asked to rate 
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the probability that each face corresponds to one of the protagonists of the 
preceding story.  These ratings were interpreted as judgements of  the faces’ 
goodness  and  intelligence.  For  example,  a  high  rating  for  an  image  as  a 
protagonist of the story with intelligent/good characters was interpreted as a 
judgement that the depicted person is both intelligent and good.
The effects of the two metaphors were predicted to influence results more or 
less independently. That is,  GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS would cause the bright-
background images to be rated more highly in the two “good” stories than in 
the two “evil” conditions, and  INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS would cause the 
bright images to be rated more highly in the “intelligent” conditions than in 
the “stupid” conditions.
2. Method
Participants.  Participants  were  77  undergraduate  students  at  a  large 
Australian  state  university,  enrolled  in  an  introductory  phonology  course. 
Participants included 11 males and 66 females, 58 native speakers of English 
and 19 with high English proficiency.
Materials.  Four  experimental  conditions  examined  all  combinations  of 
“smart” vs. “stupid,” and “good” vs. “evil,” to distinguish and compare the 
effects  of  the  visual  stimuli  involving  BRIGHTNESS on  INTELLIGENCE and 
GOODNESS.  An introductory written component (a brief  story) evoked these 
combinations  of  attributes  for  each  of  four  conditions.  One story  involved 
smart  and  good-intentioned  protagonists,  one  had  stupid  but  good-
intentioned protagonists,  one had smart but evil  protagonists,  and one had 
stupid and evil protagonists (see Appendix 1). These stories were intended to 
provide an exhaustive combination of two points on the scales of each of the 
qualities being tested, INTELLIGENCE and GOODNESS.
The  images  involved  32  male  Caucasian  faces  displayed in  colour  against 
either a light grey or a dark grey background. To minimize the effects of visual 
compensation for the background – i.e., faces on a light background appearing 
darker  –  and  to  maximize  the  effect  of  the  background  itself,  faces  were 
presented small,  filling about  5% of  the screen.  The faces  themselves  were 
neither  lightened nor  darkened in  any  condition.  In  each  background,  the 
lightest or darkest area was around the face, to suggest that the person was the 
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source  of  the  light  or  dimness.  All  participants  were  debriefed  after  the 
experiment, and no participant noticed that the faces had appeared against 
two different backgrounds.
The experiment was conducted in E-Prime 2 on Macintosh computers with 
Dell LCD monitors. Ratings were indicated by pressing the numerical keys at 
the top of the keyboard.
Procedure.  The experiment involved two tasks, a story rating task and an 
image rating task. In the story rating task, participants read one of the four 
stories and pressed the space bar when done reading. They then rated the 
“intelligence” and “good intentions” of the story protagonists on a scale from 
1 to 7, to test whether they understood the story in the intended way.
Following  each  story  rating  task,  the  experiment  progressed  to  the  image 
rating task. In this task, participants viewed a series of faces, each with either a 
lightened  or  darkened  background.  Each  face  remained  on  screen  until 
participants  rated  the  probability  that  the  face  corresponded to  one of  the 
protagonists of the preceding story. Responses were not allowed during the 
first 500 msecs of the image’s appearance, to ensure that participants saw the 
image before rating it. Ratings of probability ranged from 1 (not at all likely) to 
7 (very likely). Once a key 1—7 was pressed, the screen became a neutral grey 
for  500  msecs,  followed by  the  appearance  of  the  next  face.  Ratings  were 
interpreted  as  a  measure  of  the  faces’  perceived  intelligence  and  good 
intentions. That is, participants who rated a face highly for the “smart/good” 
story were deemed to consider that person both intelligent and good.
Design. Each participant saw all four stories in a random order. In the image 
rating task of  each story condition,  participants rated eight faces randomly 
selected from the set of 32. Four of these faces had light backgrounds, and four 
had  dark  backgrounds,  with  the  order  of  appearance  of  the  backgrounds 
randomized. In the overall experiment, each participant saw either the light or 
dark background version of each of the 32 faces, with no participant seeing the 
same face twice.
3. Results
Given the number of factors involved in the study (including the type of story, 
the  ratings  of  the  story  protagonists,  the  ratings  of  the  images  and  the 
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background of the images), results were evaluated with analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs).  An ANOVA tests  whether  the  means  of  several  groups  are  all 
equal,  and  therefore  resembles  a  t-test  conducted  across  more  than  two 
groups. To assess whether responses from non-native English speakers should 
be  included  in  the  study  results,  an  ANOVA  with  the  factors  story 
(smart/good, stupid/good, smart/evil or stupid/evil), first language (English 
or another language), and background (light or dark) was conducted. A main 
effect of language was found, F(1, 76) = 8.96, p = .00, meaning that the average 
ratings of native and non-native speakers differed overall. However, this factor 
did not interact with story type or background, meaning that the difference in 
language background was merely an overall result and not one that varied 
with the factors of interest in the study. Therefore, data from both native and 
non-native speakers of English were included in the study.
Overall, the stories were interpreted as intended. In the story rating task, mean 
evaluations of the protagonists’ “intelligence” and “good intentions” for the 
smart/good story were 6.54 for intelligence and 6.07 for good intentions, both 
high ratings on the 7-point scale. For the smart/evil story, ratings were 5.68 for 
intelligence and 1.54 for good intentions, a high and a low rating, respectively. 
The  stupid/good  story  received  2.88  for  intelligence  and  5.96  for  good 
intentions, low and high ratings respectively. For the stupid/evil story, ratings 
were 2.22 for intelligence and 1.91 for good intentions, both low ratings. These 
were large effects. For example, the difference in the 6.54 intelligence rating for 
the smart/good story and the 2.22 intelligence rating for the stupid/evil story 
was substantial, d = 3.99. An ANOVA with the factors story type (smart/good, 
stupid/good, smart/evil or stupid/evil) and rating of the protagonists’ “good 
intentions” (on a scale of 1—7),  with subject as a random factor,  showed a 
significant interaction between story type and “good intentions”,  F(1,  76)  = 
285.51, p = .00. A second ANOVA, identical except considering the factor of 
protagonist’s  “intelligence”  instead  of  “good  intentions”,  was  equally 
significant, F(1, 76) = 253.71, p = .00. 
Though all  stories  were  interpreted as  intended,  some were more effective 
than others at  communicating the relevant characteristics.  For example,  the 
stupid/good  protagonist  was  rated  a  mean  2.88  for  intelligence,  which  is 
higher than the intelligence rating of the stupid/evil protagonist, 1.91, F(1, 76) 
= 10.66,  p = .00,  d = .51.  This was the case even though both stories were 
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considered  to  involve  “stupid”  protagonists.  Similarly,  the  smart/good 
protagonist  was  rated  a  mean  6.54  for  intelligence,  higher  than  the  5.68 
intelligence rating of the smart/evil protagonist, F(1, 76) = 30.84, p = .00, d = .
724, even though both protagonists were intended to be “smart”.
In  the  image  rating  task,  the  light  and  dark  background  images  received 
different mean ratings depending on the story the participants had just read. 
For the smart/good protagonist, the images with bright backgrounds received 
a mean rating of 4.01 and the dark images received a mean of 3.79. Ratings for 
the smart/evil condition did not vary much depending on background, with a 
mean  rating  of  4.35  for  the  bright  and  4.42  for  the  dark  backgrounds. 
Stupid/good varied even less, with mean 3.64 for the bright backgrounds and 
3.67  for  the  dark  ones.  Finally,  the  stupid/evil  story  ratings  depended 
considerably on background, with mean 3.91 for the bright and 4.10 for the 
dark  backgrounds.  None  of  these  effects  was  particularly  large:  for  the 
smart/good condition, which had the largest effect of background, the effect 
size of the difference based on background was small, d = .19. The stupid/evil 
condition had the next-largest effect, d = .11.
The numerical ratings of faces from 1 to 7 were analysed using ANOVAs with 
the  factors  intelligence  (the  two  “smart”  stories  versus  the  two  “stupid” 
stories), goodness (the two “good” stories versus the two “evil” stories) and 
background (light or dark). In the by-subjects analyses, subject was treated as a 
random factor; in the by-items analyses, item (the original photo of a face) was 
treated as a random factor. The interaction between background and goodness 
(good/evil) approached significance in both the subjects analysis, F1(1, 76) = 
3.37, p = .07 and the items analysis, F2(1, 31) = 3.32, p = .08. The interaction 
between background and intelligence (smart/stupid) was not significant, F1(1, 
76) = 1.52, p = .22, F2(1, 31) = 1.73, p = .20.
Based on the observation that the smart/good story and the stupid/evil story 
showed the greatest differences in mean rating of faces with light and dark 
backgrounds (4.01 and 3.79 for smart/good, and 3.91 and 4.10 for stupid/evil), 
it was decided to compare these two stories independently of the two stories 
that mixed a positive and a negative quality (smart/evil and stupid/good). 
When only the stories combining two positive traits (the smart/good story) 
and  two  negative  traits  (the  stupid/evil  story)  were  considered,  then  the 
interaction  between  the  factors  story  (smart/good  or  stupid/evil)  and 
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background reached significance in both the subjects analysis, F1(1, 76) = 4.13, 
p = .05 and the items analysis, F2(1, 31) = 4.83, p = .04.
4. Discussion
As predicted, faces with dark backgrounds were rated highest for the story 
with the stupid and evil protagonist;  images with bright backgrounds were 
rated highest for the intelligent and good protagonist; and the other two cases 
fell  in  between.  However,  these  differences  were  significant  only  in  the 
comparison between the smart/good and the stupid/evil story.
There are two reasons that the smart/good and stupid/evil stories differed 
significantly from each other but not from the other stories. First, the effect of 
background was of the greatest magnitude in these two stories, and was in an 
opposite direction for each of the two stories. That is, brighter backgrounds led 
to  higher  ratings  for  the  smart/good  story  but  lower  ratings  for  the 
stupid/evil story. Second, the smart/good and stupid/evil stories were most 
effective  at  conveying  the  intended  characteristics.  As  noted  above,  the 
smart/good story portrayed intelligence better than the smart/evil story, as 
demonstrated  by  the  significantly  higher  rating  of  the  protagonists’ 
“intelligence”; and the stupid/evil story was a better portrayal of stupidity 
than  the  stupid/good  story.  The  effectiveness  of  these  stories  may  have 
contributed to the difference in the significance of their ratings, as opposed to 
the  two  other  stories,  which  were  less  successful  in  achieving  the  desired 
ratings for intelligence and goodness.
The experiment may have been limited overall by the faces chosen as stimuli.  
The images had expressionless faces, closed mouths, identical grey shirts, and 
no  make-up,  glasses  or  accessories.  The  individuals  depicted  were  not 
speaking or expressing themselves. It is possible that people’s intelligence, or 
perhaps  even  their  benevolence,  can  be  evaluated  only  when  they 
communicate. Images of speaking individuals might lead to stronger results. 
Alternatively,  non-human  images  might  be  preferable.  As  Nickels  (2007) 
observes, light and darkness have complex social associations, which may be 
difficult to disambiguate or control for when images of humans are involved. 
Many social factors come into play as soon as a human image is introduced, 
and the factors that are the focus of a given experiment may compete with 
stronger, unrelated associations.
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Though the study did not obtain significant separate results for INTELLIGENCE 
IS BRIGHTNESS and  GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS,  the  observation  that  these 
metaphors interacted to produce the study results is itself a novel finding. If 
INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS is indeed a metaphor distinct from  GOODNESS IS 
BRIGHTNESS,  the  interaction of  these  metaphors  implies  that  metaphors  can 
reinforce each other if they have the same, or compatible, source domain(s). A 
person that is both INTELLIGENT and GOOD is more likely to be metaphorically 
BRIGHT than one having only one of these two qualities. Rather than interfering 
with each other or creating a “mixed metaphor”, additional connections to a 
source domain appear to  strengthen the activation of that  domain.  Further 
study of the interaction of metaphors with the same source domain may prove 
fruitful both for its own findings, and for the advantages this would lend to 
the investigation of metaphors that need to be distinguished from others, such 
as INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS.
5. Conclusion
The  current  study  suggests  that  the  complex  mapping  INTELLIGENCE IS 
BRIGHTNESS is relevant in interpreting visual stimuli, but only when it does not 
conflict with another metaphor, such as GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS. Why might 
INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS be more entangled with other metaphors than, for 
example,  a  primary  metaphor  such  as  SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS (Casasanto 
2008)? As noted above, the lack of results for the stupid/good and smart/evil 
stories may be attributed to a number of factors, including the use of human 
images and the content of the stories themselves. However, the results may 
also be related to the complexity of the metaphor INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS 
and  its  dependence  on  the  primary  metaphor  KNOWING IS SEEING in 
combination with non-primary associations. Complex metaphors, founded on 
cultural  and  linguistic  experience  rather  than  arising  directly  from 
embodiment,  may have  a  more  complicated  cognitive  status  than  primary 
metaphors.  Further  study of  INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS,  and ultimately of 
other  complex  mappings  and  metaphors,  is  needed  to  disentangle 
INTELLIGENCE IS BRIGHTNESS from primary  GOODNESS IS BRIGHTNESS,  and to 
explore why and how these metaphors interact in the first place.
The  current  study  suggests  certain  complications  that  future  studies  of 
complex metaphors might encounter, such as the challenges of distinguishing 
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the effects of a primary from those of a complex metaphor, and the difficulty of 
creating appropriate visual  stimuli  to assess a complex metaphor.  Complex 
metaphors  such  as  THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS are  predicted  to  be  more 
complicated to assess than, say, SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS. It is easier to present 
visual  stimuli  that  are  CLOSE together  or  FAR apart,  and  test  the  effect  on 
judgements of  SIMILARITY, than to present  BUILDINGS and judge the effect on 
reasoning about  THEORIES.  Studies of complex metaphors and mappings are 
therefore  predicted  to  involve  more  complications  and considerations  than 
research on primary metaphors. Nevertheless, such studies are necessary to 
evaluate  the  conceptual  status  of  complex  metaphors.  The  current  study 
identifies some of the obstacles that such studies may face, but also suggests, 
in  the  findings  that  it  does  offer,  that  such  studies  may  eventually  prove 
fruitful.
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Appendix 1: Full text of stories preceding each condition
Story 1: Smart/Good
High-achieving medical students in their last year of study can apply for a 
fellowship  which  lets  them  pursue  cutting-edge  research  on  certain 
devastating diseases. The fellowship is highly competitive and only the most 
intelligent students have a chance of winning it. The winners could make more 
money elsewhere, but the fellowship allows them to use their medical genius 
to help large numbers of people.
Story 2: Smart/Evil
A group of clever computer hackers infiltrated the online bank account of a 
major charitable organisation, bypassing the advanced security protecting the 
account. The hackers then transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars from 
the charity to their own bank accounts. Although the hackers had to be very 
intelligent to carry out this plan, they must also have been ruthless to steal 
money that was meant to feed and clothe starving people.
Story 3: Stupid/Good
Some clueless new recruits for an aid organisation drove to a neighbouring 
country, thinking they might rescue orphans who had lost their families in a 
natural disaster. The aid workers actually found some orphaned children and 
put them on a bus to bring them back. However, the aid workers were arrested 
for kidnapping because they obviously didn’t have custody of the children or 
permission to take them out of the country.
Story 4: Stupid/Evil
Some members of a political party were arrested for spray-painting walls with 
slogans which falsely suggested that politicians from other parties were sexual 
criminals. When interviewed, the arrested party members yelled at reporters 
and repeated their  nasty accusations.  On the TV news,  the party members 
appeared stupid and mean, and made their own party look bad.
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